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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Aprophe and the Federal Republic of Rantania have
agreed to submit the present dispute to the Court for final resolution, by
Special Agreement in accordance with Articles 36(1) and 40(1) of the
Statute of the Court. As per Article 36, the jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases that the parties refer to it. Applicant submits to the
jurisdiction of the Court.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Can the Andler government represent the Republic of Aprophe
before this Court?
2. Is Rantania responsible for the illegal use of force against
Aprophe in the context of Operation Uniting for Democracy?
3. Did the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rantanian Courts in the
case of Turbando, et al., v. The Republic of Aprophe violate
international law?
4. Is Aprophe's destruction of a building of the Mai-Tocao Temple
consistent with international law?
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The present dispute concerns the Mai-Tacao Temple ["the Temple"]
complex, located on the border of the parties to these proceedings, the
Republic of Aprophe ["Aprophe"], the Applicant in these proceedings, and
the Federal Republic of Rantania ["Rantania"], the Respondent.
The Temple is of immense cultural significance to both parties.
Consequently, several wars were fought over the sovereignty of the
Temple. The most recent of these was the Mai-Tocao War of 1962, in
which the Aprophian military secured the site around the Temple. In the
course of this, about 500 Rantanian peasants were made to provide goods
and services to the Aprophian army, in return for three meals a day and
lodging in barracks near the labour sites. By 1965, the conflict had reached
a stalemate. A Peace Agreement ["1965 Treaty"] was signed between the
States, which submitted the boundary dispute to an arbitral tribunal. This
awarded the Temple to Aprophe, along with ten kilometres of previously
undisputed Rantanian territory. The Temple was inscribed in the World
Heritage List in 1988.
The Eastern Nations International Organisation ["ENI"] was formed in
1990 by Rantania, Lamarthia, Verland and Pellegrinia. This was a regional
organisation devoted to strengthening cooperation between members, and
included a mutual defence pact. This incorporated the Eastern Nations
Charter of Human Rights ["EN Charter"] which had been entered into by
the same States in 1980.
In 2000, Senator Mig Green ["Green"] was elected President of
Aprophe. After the election, the Green government proceeded to carry out
measures designed to secure membership of ENI, including acceding to the
EN Charter, the weakening of Aprophe's traditionally strong labour unions
and the implementation of an open border policy. By 2006, there were a
series of protests organised against the Green government.
In 2001, prompted by the documentary "Our Forgotten Workers," the
International League for Solidarity and Access ["ILSA"] instituted
proceedings against Aprophe in the Aprophian Courts on behalf of 60
former military internees. This case, Turbando et al v. The Republic of
Aprophe, sought compensation from the Aprophian government for the
uncompensated labour of the Rantanian peasants. Finding that the claim
was barred by limitation in the Aprophian Courts, ILSA instituted similar
proceedings before Rantanian Courts on behalf of the internees, alleging
forced labour. The Rantanian Courts initially dismissed the claim against
Aprophe as being barred by a waiver in the 1965 Treaty. Consequently, in
January 2009, ILSA filed a petition against the Eastern Nations Court ["EN
Court"], which found that the waiver in the 1965 Treaty would leave the
plaintiffs without a remedy. In December 2009, in accordance with the EN
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Court's decision, the Rantanian trial Court exercised jurisdiction and further
held that foreign sovereign immunity did not extend to violations of
peremptory norms of international law, and proceeded to award
compensation to the plaintiffs. This was denounced by the Aprophian
Minister for Foreign Affairs as "an unacceptable violation of Aprophe's
immunity... "
Further, as a result of the decision in Turbando, there were widespread
protests against the Green government. In response to the social unrest that
followed, Green declared emergency on January 20, 2011, and postponing
elections scheduled for March 2011 by one year. Green also ordered the
Aprophian military to begin armed patrols in major urban areas to "prevent
and quell civilian unrest." In response to this, Aprophian Chief of Staff
General Paige Andler ["Andler"] wrote an open letter to Green, refusing to
take up arms against the people of Aprophe. Subsequently, Green ordered
her dismissal and arrest on charges of insubordination and sedition. On
January 16, 2011, Andler and some soldiers entered the Presidential Palace
and other governmental installations in Marcelux, the capital of Aprophe.
As Green and his ministers fled to Rantania, Andler declared herself
"interim president" of Aprophe.
Within two days of the coup, the Andler government had established
order over the bulk of the Aprophian population and territory. Even as
Andler dissolved Parliament, she continually reiterated that "elections
[would] be called soon" and that civil liberties would be protected. Only
two villages in the outlying regions of Aprophe remained outside Andler's
control. These were controlled by the National Homeland Brigade
["NHB"], which was loyal to Green. The Andler government ordered the
Quick Reactionary Force ['QRF"] to confront the NHB. Only small-scale
fighting took place from January 20, 2011.
Meanwhile, Green and his ministers formed a "government in exile" in
Rantania, and held talks to intervene to restore that government in Aprophe.
At Rantania's initiation, the ENI recognised the Green government. The
Green government then proceeded to request intervention in Aprophe from
the ENI, in response to artillery strikes carried out by the QRF against the
villages with NHB bases. On February 15, 2011, the ENI approved
Rantania's proposal for the approval of Activation Orders for Operation
Uniting for Democracy ["OUD"]. These permitted air strikes against
Aprophe. Major-General Otaz Brewscha ["Brewscha"], a reserve officer in
the Rantanian air force, was appointed Force Commander. The air strikes
were carried out almost exclusively by the Rantanian air force, as it was the
only ENI member State with significant airborne capability.
Within only days from its commencement on February 18, 2011, the
air strikes had destroyed twelve of the fifteen military installations in
[Vol. 19:1
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Aprophe, and had killed fifty Aprophian soldiers. The Sterfel Institute, an
independent military think-tank, reported that the Aprophian military could
no longer defend itself. Despite this, the attacks air strikes continued. By
February 27, 2011, the Andler government fled to the Mai-Tocao National
Park. The next day, she announced that since Aprophe could no longer
defend itself, she would be forced to destroy part of the Temple in response
to the attacks. As the air strikes did not cease even after a Security Council
resolution "call[ing] upon" ENI member States to end OUD, Andler's staff
destroyed a part of one of the buildings in the Mai-Tocao complex. The
ENI Council suspended OUD shortly thereafter.
Andler then filed an application before the Registry of the
International Court of Justice instituting proceedings against Rantania.
Since Rantania did not consent to jurisdiction based on the compromissory
clause in the 1965 Treaty, the parties drafted this Compromis which is now
before this Court.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Only a government that exercises 'effective control' over the state's
territory can fulfil international obligations on behalf of the State. Thus,
under customary international law, only the Andler government may
represent Aprophe before this Court as it exercises effective control over
Aprophe's territory and population. Governments lacking effective control
cannot represent States solely because they have legitimate origins.
Furthermore, since the Andler government has not displayed an
unwillingness to comply with international human rights obligations, it
cannot be denied the right to represent Aprophe internationally.
This Court may exercise jurisdiction over the present claim as ENI is
not an indispensible third party to the dispute. The principle of
indispensible third parties does not apply to international organisations. In
any event, ENI is not a subject of international law. Moreover, the
determination of ENI's responsibility is not a pre-requisite to the
adjudication of the claim against Rantania.
Rantania exercised control over the operational decisions with respect
to the conduct of the Rantanian air force in OUD. This satisfies the test of
effective control necessary to attribute actions of the air force to Rantania.
The test of ultimate authority and control is inapposite in the present claim,
and cannot be relied on to avoid attribution to Rantania. Finally, Rantania
used ENI in order to circumvent its obligations in international law. As a
result, Rantania is responsible for the air strikes in OUD.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is a complete prohibition on the use of
force irrespective of the motivation behind it. As a result, the air strikes in
OUD constitute a violation of Article 2(4), even if they were carried out for
humanitarian purposes. Further, intervention in order to restore the Green
government is unlawful, as international law does not recognise
intervention for the restoration of democracy. Moreover, the Green
government could not invite intervention for its restoration. The use of
force pursuant to such intervention is unlawful. Finally, customary
international law does not States permit a right of unilateral humanitarian
intervention. Consequently, Rantania is responsible for the unlawful use of
force in OUD.
Rantania's exercise of jurisdiction in Turbando et al. v. The Republic
of Aprophe allowing individuals' claims for forced labour violates
international law. In the exercise of their sovereign powers, both Aprophe
and Rantania had validly waived individuals' claims under Article XV of
the 1965 Treaty. Aprophe can invoke Article XV as the decision of the EN
Court invalidating Article XV does not bind Aprophe. Further, the EN
Charter's non-retroactive application implies that it cannot regulate the
application of Article XV.
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Further, Rantania's denial of immunity from jurisdiction to Aprophe is
not justified under the tort exception as the conduct of the Aprophian
military does not fall within the scope of this exception. Nor does the
violation of jus cogens norms justify denial of immunity as there is no
conflict between the substantive jus cogens violation and the procedural
norm of immunity. Customary international law also does not recognise
such an exception.
The destruction of a building of the Temple does not violate
international law. Breach of Article 1 of the 1965 Treaty requires an attack
against an adversary causing harm to its military operations. Thus,
destruction within Aprophe's own territory does not violate Article 1. In
any case, the non-performance exception negatives Aprophe's
wrongfulness.
Rantania cannot invoke the World Heritage Convention as the
Convention does not create an erga omnes obligation. In any case, such an
obligation does not confer standing to institute proceedings before the
Court. In any event, the destruction does not violate the Convention as the
Convention is inapplicable during armed conflict.
The non-exhaustion of local remedies precludes Rantania from
exercising diplomatic protection for enforcing the rights guaranteed under
the ICESCR. In any event, the ICESCR does not apply either during armed
conflict or extra-territorially.
Even in the event that the World Heritage Convention and the
ICESCR are applicable, international humanitarian law recognises the
'imperative military necessity' to destruction of cultural property during
armed conflict. Since this exception justifies the destruction in the present
case, Aprophe's act does not violate the World Heritage Convention,
ICESCR or customary international law.
2012]
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PLEADINGS
I. THE ANDLER GOVERNMENT CAN REPRESENT APROPHE BEFORE THIS
COURT AS THE RIGHTFUL GOVERNMENT OF APROPHE.
The Andler government has come to power in Aprophe through a
military coup d'etat. Aprophe requests the Court to find that governments
with effective control may represent States internationally [A]. Further, the
Andler government exercises effective control [B]. Finally, the Andler
government does not fall within the exceptions to the effective control
principle [C]. Consequently, it may represent Aprophe internationally.
A. Customary international law confers a right of representation on
governments exercising effective control.
Aprophe submits that a government exercising effective control can
represent States internationally [a]. Further, customary international law
does not permit governments lacking effective control to represent States
solely based on the legitimacy of their origins [b].
1. A government exercising effective control can represent the State
internationally.
The authority of a government to represent a State internationally
stems from its effective control.' As demonstrated in Tinoco,2 this is
premised on government's control of state machinery, crucial to fulfilling
the international obligations of the State. Indeed, a change of government
inconsistent with the municipal law of the State cannot, ipso facto, negate
such authority.3 As a result, customary international law only empowers
governments with effective control to represent States.
Extensive State practice supports this view.4 For instance, the GA
permitted representation by military governments including Pakistan's
5 6Musharraf government 5  and Thailand's Chulanont government.
Additionally, the requirement of opinio juris is satisfied. In Resolution
2758, the GA referred to the People's Republic of China, which exercised
1. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 639 (1947); AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (1997) ["AKEHURST"].
2. Arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica, 18(1) AJIL 147, 157 (1924)["Tinoco"].
3. Cyprus v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, App.No.6780 & 6950/75, T4.
4. Genocide Case, Preliminary Objections, 1996 ICJ General List No. 91, Memorial, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 41; Luther v. Sagor [1920] A. 1861; Ratliff, UN Representation Disputes, 87 CAL. L.
REv. 1207,1226 (1999).
5. U.N.Doc.A/56iPV.45.
6. U.N.Doc.A/62/PV.9, 19.
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effective control, China's "legitimate representatives'. Furthermore, the
reference to the determination of representation based on "principles and
purposes" of the Charter in UNGA Resolution 396(V),8 Aprophe submits
that this is not inconsistent with the test of effective control. As Secretary-
General Lie observed, the functioning of the UN requires that governments
be in control of the machinery of the State, in order to fulfil international
obligations.9 In any event, the existence of widespread and consistent State
practice in favour of effective control leads to a presumption of opinio
juris.'0 Aprophe therefore submits that governments with effective control
may represent States internationally.
2. Customary international law does not permit representation by
governments solely by reason of their constitutional origin.
State practice permitting representation by governments lacking
effective control is sparse, I" and does not meet the "uniform and
widespread' requirement for the formation of customary international
law. 12 Indeed, the non-representation of the undemocratic regime in Haiti
3
is regarded as an exception to the general rule of representation.
4
Moreover, opinio juris does not support representation by governments
lacking effective control. The African Union Act 15 and the Charter of the
Organisation of American States 16 embody distinct norms, and do not
reflect opinio juris sufficient to lead to a conclusion of the existence of
custom. Thus, customary international law does not confer a right of
representation by reason of legitimate origin alone. At best, any such rule
is lexferenda.17
7. U.N.Doc.A/RES/2758.
8. U.N.Doc.A/RES/396(V).
9. U.N.Doc.S/1466.
10. Case No: STL- 11-0111, 199 (Interlocutory decision of 16th February).
11. Crawford, Democracy and the Body of International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (Fox & Roth eds., 2000)["Crawford-Democracy"]; Murphy, Democratic
Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments, 48(3) ICLQ 545, 572 (1999) ["Murphy"].
12. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 ICJ 3, 74.
13. Crawford-Democracy, 115.
14. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 260(2000).
15. Article 30, CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 (2000).
16. Article 9, CHARTER OF THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 119 U.N.T.S. 1609
(1952).
17. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86(1) AJIL 46, 91(1992)
["Franck"].
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3. Non-recognition by other States does not affect the capacity of the
Andler Government to represent Aprophe.
Rantania may contend that several States have recognised only the
Green government, and consequently, only the Green government may
represent Aprophe internationally. However, recognition refers to the
willingness of a State to carry on relations with the government of another
State. 18 The question in this case refers to the right of a government to
represent a State internationally, and not in relations between States. 19 As a
result, non-recognition does not affect representation by the Andler
government.
B. The Andler Government exercises effective control.
The existence of effective control is determined by several factors,
including control over the capital and State apparatus. 20 Here, the Andler
government controls the Presidential Palace and the government
installations in Marcelux, the Aprophian capital. Subsequent to the
dissolution of the Aprophian Parliament, it has remained the only entity in
control of these. Moreover, the ability to maintain public order,21 and the
ability to command obedience of the majority of a population22 also leads to
the inference of an effective control. In less than a week following the
coup, Andler's government had established order over eighty per cent of the
population of Aprophe, and about ninety per cent of its territory. The fact
that the National Homeland Brigade controlled some parts of Aprophe's
territory is not fatal to a finding of effective control.23 It is therefore
submitted that the Andler government exercises effective control over
Aprophe.
C. The Andler government has not committed acts sufficient to deny it a
right of representation.
A government may be denied representation if it has been installed by
foreign military intervention, if it denies a people the right to self-
determination, or if it remains unwilling to fulfil international human rights
18. TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2001).
19. U.N.Doc.S/1466.
20. Blix, Contemporary Aspects of Recognition,130 RDC 586, 642 (1970) ["Blix"].
21. Tinoco,154.
22. Blix, 642.
23. Blix, 641-642.
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24obligations. Here, the Andler government has not committed human
rights violations [a], nor has it displayed an unwillingness to fulfil its
international obligations [b] sufficient to warrant denial of the right of
representation.
1. The Andler government has not committed human rights violations
sufficient to warrant denial of a right of representation.
Governments may be denied the right to represent States if they
commit violations of peremptory norms.25 However, not all violations of
human rights warrant the denial of the right of representation. Thus, the
apartheid government in South Africa was denied the right of
26 2representation. However, the military governments of Pakistan,27
Thailand 28 and Guinea-Bissau29 were represented in the UN, despite having
declared emergency and suspending civil liberties. 30  Here, even as the
Andler government declared emergency, it promised that fresh elections
would be conducted, and that civil liberties would be protected. Rantania
may seek to establish that the deployment of the QRF constituted a
violation of human rights sufficient to deny a right of representation.
However, Aprophe submits that this was only a lawful exercise of the right
of governments to suppress rebellion.3' Consequently, the Andler
government may represent Aprophe internationally.
2. The Andler government has not displayed an unwillingness to fulfil
international obligations.
An unwillingness to comply with international obligations may serve
as a ground to deny a government the right of representation.32 This is
evidenced in consistent and flagrant violations of international law. For
instance, the GA denied representation to the government of South Africa
as apartheid constituted aflagrant violation of the obligations under the UN
24. Talmon, Who is a Legitimate Government in Exile?, in REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1999) ["Talmon"].
25. Taki, Effectiveness, MPEPIL 10 (2008).
26. U.N.Doc.A/RES/506; D'Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of
Democracy, 38 NYU L. J. 877, 905 (2007).
27. U.N.Doc.A/56/PV.45.
28. U.N.Doc.A/62/PV.9, 19.
29. U.N.Doc.S/PV.4834.
30. Pongsudhirak, Thailand Since The Coup, 19(4) J.DEMOCRACY 140, 146(2008); Roth,
Despots Masquerading as Democrats, 1 (1) J.H.RTS.PRAC 140, 155 (2009).
31. Congo, 2005 ICJ 168, 45-6.
32. Talmon; Magiera, Governments, MPEPIL 18 (2011).
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Charter. 3 Similarly, the Taliban was denied representation, as it used the
territory of Afghanistan for terrorism, despite several binding SC
resolutions.34 In the present case, the Andler government has assured the
conduct of elections, and has promised that civil liberties would be
protected. This indicates a commitment to democracy and to international
human rights obligations. 35 Further, the Andler government has signed the
present Compromis, indicating its willingness to comply with the
international obligation of peaceful dispute resolution.36 Thus, Aprophe
submits that the Andler government has not displayed an unwillingness to
comply with international obligations. As a result, Aprophe requests the
Court to find that the Andler government may represent it internationally.
II. RANTANIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE IN
OPERATION UNITING FOR DEMOCRACY.
Pursuant to ENI's Activation Orders, a force comprising primarily the
Rantanian air-force carried out air strikes in Aprophe. Aprophe requests the
Court to find that it may exercise jurisdiction over the present claim as the
ENI is not an indispensible third party to the proceedings. [A]. Further, the
use of force in OUD was unlawful [B]. Finally, the use of force in OUD is
attributable to Rantania [C].
A. This Court can exercise jurisdiction over the question of responsibility
for the use offorce.
According to the Court in Monetary Gold,37 this Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction where a third party's interests form the subject-matter of the
dispute. Aprophe submits that this principle in Monetary Gold does not
apply to international organisations [a]. In any event, ENI is not a subject
of international law as it does not possess separate legal personality [b].
Even if ENI possesses separate legal personality, the adjudication of ENI's
responsibility is not a pre-requisite to the adjudication of the present claim
[c].
33. U.N.Doc.A/RES/506.
34. Wolfrum & Phillip, The Status of the Taliban, MAX PLANCK YBUNL 561, 581-2(2002).
35. U.N.Doc.S/PV.4834.
36. SIMMA, UN CHARTER: A COMMENTARY 183 (2002) ["SIMMA"]; U.N.Doc.A/Res/506(VI).
37. Monetary Gold, 1954 1CJ 19, 32.
[Vol. 19:1
Distinguished Brief
1. The principle of indispensible parties does not apply to international
organisations.
Since only States may be parties before the Court, applying the
Monetary Gold principle will have the effect of depriving the Court of
jurisdiction in every case involving an international organisation. This
could not have been the intention of Article 34,38 as it would permit States
to abuse the process of the Court by acting through international
organisations. While Rantania may contend that Macedonia39 implicitly
applied the Monetary Gold principle to international organisations,
Aprophe submits that the Court did not consider this question in that case.
As a result, the Monetary Gold principle is inapplicable in this case.
2. In any event, ENI is not a subject of international law
The intention of the founding member-States determines whether an
international organisation possesses legal personality. 40  This may be
discerned by an examination of whether the functions of the 1O necessitate
an inference of legal personality. 41  ENI was established to promote
economic cooperation in the region, and to take collective action. These do
not necessitate an inference of the organisation's separate legal
personality.42 Moreover, the provisions of the ENI Treaty also do not
establish ENI's legal personality. Such an inference must be implied from
the provisions of the treaty as a whole.43 Despite providing for privileges
and immunities, as well as for separate organs, the ENI treaty does not
contain a provision obligating members to carry out decisions of the ENI.
This suggests a lack of personality.44
3. In any event, ENI is not an indispensible third party to the proceedings.
The Monetary Gold principle only applies where the determination of
the third party's rights is a pre-requisite to the adjudication of the claim
before the Court.45 It cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction where the
38. ZIMMERMAN ET AL, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, A
COMMENTARY 604(2005).
39. FYRM v. Greece, 2009 ICJ 19, 32.
40. BOWETr'S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 476 (2009).
41. Reparation, 1949 ICJ 174, 178-9.
42. BOTHE, OSCE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY 198 (1997).
43. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS 78(2005).
44. Reparations, 178-9; Reuterswiird, The Legal Nature of International Organizations, 49
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT INT'L REv.14, 15-22 (1980).
45. East Timor, 1995 ICJ 90, 30.
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responsibility of the parties may be determined independent of the third
party. 6 The present claim concerns the responsibility of Rantania for its
own conduct, and not that of ENI. The attribution of the acts of the
Rantanian air force to the ENI is only a question of fact, and not of the legal
rights of ENI.47 As a result, Rantania's responsibility for the acts of its air
force, and the degree of control exercised by Rantania may be ascertained
without affecting the legal rights of ENI.48
Further, the Monetary Gold principle was intended to apply only
where the third party's interests formed the subject-matter of the claim,
such that any decision would, in effect, bind the third party despite the
protection provided under Article 59.49 Such decision would defeat the
protection provided under Article 59 of the Court's Statute. A
determination of Rantania's responsibility for the circumvention of its
obligations through ENI would not have this effect. Even if the Court were
to arrive at a conclusion of ENI's responsibility, the enforcement of the
award would not bind the ENI. Consequently, the Monetary Gold principle
does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in the present case.
B. The use offorce in OUD is unlawful.
Aprophe requests the Court to find that the air strikes constitute a
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter [a]. Further, intervention
directed at the restoration of the Green government is unlawful [b].
Moreover, the air strikes were not carried out as a lawful exercise of the
right of humanitarian intervention [c].
1. The air strikes carried out in the course of OUD violate Article 2(4).
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter proscribes all use of force, irrespective
of the motivation behind it. 50 This is supported by the travaux, as the text
of Article 2(4) at the Dumbarton Oakes Conference read as a complete
prohibition on the use of force51 and the expression "territorial integrity
and political independence" was inserted to provide a safeguard to small
46. Nauru, 1992 ICJ 240, 155; Oil Platforms, 2003 ICJ 161 (Judge Simma Sep.Op.), $$ 82-3.
47. Larsen/Hawaiian Kingdom Arbitration, 119 ILR (2001) 566, 111.24.
48. Nuhanovi6 v. The Netherlands, ILDC 1742 (NL 2011), $ 5.8.
49. East Timor, (Judge Weeramantry Diss.Op.), 156-7.
50. Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 4, 109; Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a
Century, 159 RDC 1, 9(1978) ["Arechaga"].
51. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 266 (1963)
["BROWNLIE 1I"].
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States. 52 Indeed, even as the Drafting Committee accepted an Australian
amendment proposing the insertion of this phrase, it clarified that "the
unilateral use offorce ... is not authorized or admitted."53 The rejection of
the New Zealand amendment proposing a narrower view of Article 2(4)
bolsters this position.54 In any event, custom that has developed alongside
the Charter supports a wide interpretation of Article 2(4).55
Further, the view that humanitarian intervention is not "inconsistent
with the purposes of the UN" is untenable as the maintenance of peace
overrides all other obligations in international law.56 Although Articles 55
and 56 obligate member-States to promote human rights, they do not
authorise the use of force for this end. Indeed, the use of the term
promotion, and not protection of human rights was intended to avoid
raising "hopes going beyond what the United Nations could successfully
accomplish. 57 Moreover, the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention
is at odds with the SC's monopoly over the use of force under the Charter.58
Thus any use of force, even in humanitarian intervention, is inconsistent
with the purposes of the UN.59 Therefore, Aprophe submits that OUD was
a violation of Article 2(4).
2. Intervention directed at the restoration of the Green government is
unlawful.
Rantania may seek to establish a right to intervene in order to restore
governance by a democratically elected government in Aprophe. However,
the right to democratic governance has not crystallised into customary
international law. 60 Further, international law does not does not permit the
use of force for the restoration of democracy. 61 Frequently cited instances
of pro-democratic intervention, including Grenada (1983), Panama (1989)
52. Brownlie, General Course on Public International Law, 255 RDC 9,199 (1995);
Arechaga, 9 1.
53. Lachs, The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time, 169 RDC
9, 324(1980).
54. BROWNLIE 11266.
55. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 68-9 (1st edn., 1946);
GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 51-2 (2nd edn., 1969).
56. Cassese, Ex injuria Ius Oritur, 10(1) EJIL 23, 24(1999).
57. Simon, Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 24 CAL. W.INT'L
L.J. 117, 134(1993).
58. Villani, The Security Council's Authorisation of Enforcement Action by Regional
Organisations, MAX PLANCK YBUNL 535, 552(2002).
59. Arechaga, 91.
60. Franck, 91.
61. Nanda, US. Forces in Panama, 84 AJIL 494, 500(1990) ["Nanda"].
2012]
172 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
and Sierra Leone (1997) have been widely condemned as unlawful.62 As a
result, Rantania cannot claim a right of pro-democratic intervention.
Aprophe further submits that the use of force on Green's invitation
remained unlawful. States have an inalienable right against intervention
directed at imposing a political system. 63 It is well-settled that States
cannot intervene at the invitation of the constitutional government in a civil
war, as it is uncertain whether this government retains in effective control,
and hence, the right to represent a State.64 Indeed, where a government
retains effective control, it cannot invite intervention even against civil
strife.65 Aprophe submits that, afortiori, that intervention at the invitation
of a deposed government is unlawful. In particular, such intervention is
unlawful where it is directed at the restoration of that government.
3. Humanitarian intervention is unlawful under customary international law
Customary international law does not authorize intervention for the
protection of human rights.66 Practice suggesting the existence of such a
right must refer to humanitarian considerations as humanitarian intervention
must solely be for humanitarian motives.67  Contrary to this, the
interventions in Dominican Republic (1965), Stanleyville (1965) and
Cambodia (1978) were for the protection of the nationals of the intervening
68States. The interventions in Sierra Leone (1997) and Bangladesh (1971)
have been regarded as being politically motivated.69 State practice,
therefore, does not support the right of humanitarian intervention.
Opinio juris with respect to humanitarian intervention is also
insufficient. 70 Although some NATO States referred to the intervention in
62. U.N.Doc.S/1997/958; U.N.Doc.A/RES/44/240; U.N.Doc.A/RES/38/7.
63. U.N.Doc.A/RES/2625; Nicaragua, 1986 ICJ 14, 191-2.
64. SIMMA, 121.
65. Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, MPEPIL 6; Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of
Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 BYIL189, 214-221(1985); Resolution on the
Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars, 56 INS. INT'L L. 544(1975); U.N.Doc.A/Res/38/7;
U.N.Doc.S/16077/REV.1.
66. Rodley, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention,38(2) ICLQ 321, 327(1980);
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 374 (2005).
67. Joyner, Responsibility to Protect, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 713(2007); Brownlie & Apperly,
Kosovo Crisis Inquiry,49(4) ICLQ 878, 904(2000) ["Brownlie-III"].
68. Terry, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, ARMY L. 36, 42(2004)
["Terry"].
69. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 33 (2008); Schachter, In Defense
of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U.CHI.L.REv. 144(1986).
70. Cotten, Human Rights and Collective Security, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION AND
THE USE OF FORCE 88, 102(2008).
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Kosovo as a lawful exercise of the right of humanitarian intervention,7'
several others doubted the legality of the operation.72 Moreover, the US did
not rely on the right of humanitarian intervention, but on SC Resolution
1199 to justify the operation.73 Additionally, Germany and Belgium
cautioned that Kosovo was sui generis, and not to be regarded as forming
precedent.74  Indeed, even the World Summit Outcome on the
Responsibility to Protect only permits intervention on authorisation of the
sc.
75
Furthermore, given that implicit authorisation under Article 53 must be
unequivocal,76 Rantania cannot rely on the SC Resolution of 1 March 2011
condemning OUD as implicitly authorising OUD. Indeed, the airstrikes in
OUD were carried out without the authorisation of the SC, as required by
Article 53 and as such, violate international law.
77
C. The use offorce in OUD is attributable to Rantania.
Aprophe submits that Rantania is responsible for the use of force in
OUD as it exercised effective control over the conduct of the Rantanian air
force [a]. The test of ultimate authority and control is inapposite in this
case [b]. In any event, Rantania used ENI as a means of circumventing its
obligations in international law [c].
1. Rantania exercised effective control over the conduct of the Rantanian
air force.
Under customary international law, the conduct of a State organ placed
at the disposal of an international organisation is attributable to the entity
exercising effective control.78 Aprophe submits that Rantania exercised
effective control over the conduct of the air strikes. Here, the Rantanian air
force had been placed at the disposal of ENI. However, as it had not been
fully seconded to ENI, the powers retained by Rantania are determinative of
71. Brownlie-Ill.
72. Cassese, A Follow-up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis,
10 EJIL 791, 792(1999). ["Cassese Follow-Up"].
73. Terry, 42.
74. Cassese Follow-Up, 793.
75. U.N.Doc.A/60/L.1, 31.
76. Gray, From Unity to Polarisation, 13(1) EJIL 1, 7(2002).
77. Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies with Special Reference to the OAS,
42 BYIL 175, 220(1969).
78. Article 7, ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (2011)
["DARIO"]; U.N.Doc.A/51/389, 18; Gaja, Second Report, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/541["Second
Report"], 40; U.N.Doc.A/C.6/59/SR.21,121,32,39; AI-Jedda v. UK, App.No.27021/08, 84.
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effective control.79 In particular, since the air strikes were carried out
"almost exclusively" by the Rantanian air force, the withdrawal of the
forces would have a crippling effect on the operation. 80  As a result, the
retention of the power of withdrawal strongly suggests Rantania's effective
control.81  In fact, the withdrawal of the Rantanian air force possibly
resulted in the suspension of OUD. This is bolstered by Brewscha's
position as Force Commander, as well as reserve officer in the Rantanian
air force, which suggests that some directions may have been issued by
82Rantania. In any event, Article 48, DARIO provides for multiple
attribution where command and control over an organ is shared by several
entities. The ability of Rantania to influence the conduct of OUD suggests
shared command and control, leading to multiple attribution.83 While
Rantania may contend that effective control requires the issuance of
specific directions in relation to individual acts,84 Aprophe submits that this
is inapplicable in the present case. The test in Nicaragua is inapposite in
relation to organs which comprise an organised, hierarchical structure, 85 and
the acts of the organ are directed at achieving a purpose identical to that of
the controlling entity.86
2. The test of ultimate authority and control does not apply.
The ultimate authority and control test, which seeks to attribute acts to
international organisations on the ground that they were delegated by the
organisation, 87 is inapposite. First, the Court in Behrami relied on the test
of delegation applied in the context of State responsibility in order to
attribute actions to the UN. However, international organisations are not
analogous to States, and delegation of responsibility by an international
organisation does not of itself serve as a ground for attribution.88 Secondly,
79. Commentary on Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations, 28 7;
Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations, 19 EJIL 509(2008).
80. Seyersted, United Nations Forces, 37 BYIL 351, 384(1961).
81. Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a system of Effective
Accountability, 51 (1) HARV. J.INT'L L. 133, 150(2010).
82. Mustafii v. Netherlands, LJN:BR5386, 5.18.
83. HIRSCH, RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS TowARDs THIRD PARTIES
66(1995).
84. Nicaragua, 115.
85. Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-I-A, (Judge Shahabuddeen, Sep. Op.), 16.
86. Genocide Case, 2007 ICJ 43 (Judge Ad HocMahiou, Diss. Op.), 1 14-5; (Vice-President
AI-Khasawneh, Diss. Op.), 38-9.
87. Behrami v. France, App.No.71412/01 ["Behrami"].
88. Milanovic & Papic, As Bad as it Gets, 58(2) ICLQ 284, 289(2009).
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the decision in Behrami turned on the exercise of effective control by the
UN over the territory of Kosovo 89 and on the UN retaining the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.90
Finally, the decision in Behrami is not reflective of custom. Customary
international law recognises only the derivative responsibility of
international organisations for the authorisation of unlawful acts, and does
not rule out the responsibility of the State carrying out the mandate of the
organisation. 9' In any case Rantania's obligations under the UN Charter
would override any obligation under the ENI Treaty.92 Thus, since the air
strikes constituted a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, Rantania's
participation in the air strikes amounts to a breach of the obligation to
refrain from the use of force. The ENI's authorisation of the air strikes
does not absolve Rantania of responsibility of this obligation. 9'
3. In any event, Rantania used ENI as a means of circumvention of its
obligations.
States incur primary responsibility for acts committed by an
international organisation, if the organisation is used as a means to
circumvent its obligations in international law.94  An inference of
circumvention follows if a State exercises control over an organisation, so
as to undermine the autonomy of the international organisation, 95 and hence
causes a certain decision to be taken.96 This test is particularly apposite in
small organisations, which exercise limited autonomy from their
members.97 In the present case, Green invited intervention from Rantania.
However, Rantania introduced a resolution before the ENI Council for
intervention by ENI, despite being the only ENI member-State with the
airborne military capacity necessary for such an operation. Moreover,
Force Commander Brewscha was appointed at Rantania's suggestion.
89. Sari, Autonomy, Attribution and Accountability, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND
THE IDEA OF AUTONOMY 259 (2011).
90. Behrami, 1132; Bell, Reassessing Multiple Attribution, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L.&POL.501,
511(2010).
91. Article 17, DARIO.
92. Articles 103, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (1945).
93. Second Report, 7; FINAL REPORT ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, BERLIN CONFERENCE (2004), 28.
94. Article 61, DARIO; Waite & Kennedy, App.No.26083/94, 67; Bosphorus v. Ireland,
App.No.45036/98, 154.
95. Aspremont, Abuse of the Legal Personality of International Organisations, 4 INT'L ORG.
L.R. 91, 101(2007).
96. DARIO Commentary, 122 7.
97. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 684 (2008).
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Although Rantania may contend that it lacked specific intent to circumvent
obligations through ENI, Aprophe submits that specific intent need not be
established in order to arrive at an inference of circumvention of
obligations.98 Therefore, Aprophe submits that Rantania used ENI as a
means to circumvent its obligations in international law. Consequently,
Rantania is responsible for the use of force in OUD.
III. RANTANIA MAY NOT EXECUTE THE JUDGMENT IN TURBANDO, ET AL.,
V. THE REPUBLIC OF APROPHE.
Aprophe requests the Court to hold that the Rantanian courts' exercise
of jurisdiction in Turbando, et al., v. The Republic of Aprophe violated
international law since Article XV of the 1965 Treaty bars all claims by
individuals [A]. Additionally, Rantania's exercise of jurisdiction violates
Aprophe's sovereign immunity [B].
A. Article XV of the 1965 Treaty bars all claims by individuals.
Since the EN Court's decision invalidating Article XV does not bind
Aprophe [a] and the EN Charter does not affect Aprophe's rights under that
provision [b], Aprophe can invoke Article XV. Alternatively, Article XV is
valid as States can waive claims on behalf of individuals [c].
1. The non-binding nature of the EN Court's decision entitles Aprophe to
invoke Article XV
a. Aprophe's reservation to the EN Court's jurisdiction is valid
Aprophe submits that since all State parties to the EN Charter
consented to Aprophe's reservation, it is valid. According to the Court,99
the validity of a reservation is governed by objections from other State
parties. In fact, Switzerland's impermissible reservation to the League of
Nations was validated by unanimous consent of State parties.'00 The ILC
also authorises state-parties to accept even an impermissible reservation. 10
Although the final draft of the ILC Guidelines omits this provision, this
deletion was based on other grounds, such as inadequate time-period for
filing objections. 0 2
98. Gaja, Fourth Report, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/564/Add.2, 73.
99. Reservations, 1951 ICJ 15, 21.
100. Mendelson, Reservations to the Constitutions of International Organizations, 45 BYIL
137, 140-141(1972).
101. ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations with commentaries, 513(2010).
102. U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/639, 16-19.
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In any case, in consonance with the Court's jurisprudence, 0 3
Aprophe's reservation does not affect its substantive obligations under the
EN Charter. Thus, the reservation is compatible with the object and
purpose of the Charter.
b. In the event that the reservation is invalid, Aprophe is not bound by the
EN Charter.
Reservation to a treaty-provision is instrumental to the State's consent
to be bound by the treaty.1 4 Thus, the UN Secretary-General's Practice 0 5
and state practice 106 consistently endorse the Court's opinion 10 7 that the
author of an invalid reservation is not considered a party to the convention.
Recent state practice 10 8 to the contrary is too sparse and inconsistent to
develop a rule of custom. Hence, the non-severability of Aprophe's
reservation implies its non-membership of the EN Charter.
c. In any event, the EN Court's decision does not bind Aprophe.
Article 31(3) of the EN Charter obligates States to comply with only
those EN Court judgments that are made directly against them.'0 9 Thus,
Aprophe has the discretion,"10 and not an obligation, to follow the EN
Court's judgment declaring Article XV as invalid. Thus, Aprophe's rights
under Article XV do not conflict with its EN Charter obligations."'
Consequently, in the absence of a conflict, Aprophe can invoke Article XV.
2. The EN Charter does not affect Aprophe's rights under Article XV
The temporal law governing substantive rights and obligations is
that in force at the time of commission of an act. 1 2 Indeed, the EN Charter
itself prescribes against retroactivity." 3 Since the EN Charter came into
force after the 1965 Treaty, Article 13 of the Charter does not regulate the
application of Article XV.
103. Armed Activities, 2006 ICJ 6, 67.
104. Interhandel, 1959 ICJ 6 (Judge Lauterpacht Diss.Op.), 117.
105. U.N.Doc.ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 57, 191-3.
106. 15th Report on Reservations to Treaties, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/624/Add.1, 450-1.
107. Reservations, 29.
108. Klabbers, A New Nordic Approach to Reservation, 69 NoRDic J.INT'L L. 179, 183-185,
(2000).
109. HARRIS ET AL, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 700(1995).
110. Ress, The Effect of Decisions and Judgements of the European Court of Human Rights in
the Domestic Legal Order, 40 TEX.INT'L L.J. 359, 374(2005).
Ill. FYRM v. Greece, 109-110.
112. Nauru, 250-253.
113. Article 31(2), EN Charter.
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Rantania may contend that Article XV is not an instantaneous act but
constitutes a 'continuing situation', recurring during the period Article 13 is
applicable. However, the extinguishment of a right does not create a
'continuing situation'. 14  In any event, the right to remedy, a secondary
right, cannot independently constitute a continuing breach. 15 Thus, in the
absence of any incompatibility, Article XV continues to apply.
3. Article XV is valid as States can waive claims on behalf of individuals.
While international law recognises individuals' right to reparation for
IHL violations, it entitles States, and not individuals themselves, to claim
such reparation [i] and States have the authority to waive this right [ii].
a. International law entitles only States to claim reparations on behalf of
individuals
Customary international law does not entitle individuals to claim
reparations for IHL violations.1 16  The travaux of the 1907 Hague
Convention and decisions of national courts 17 suggest that Article 3, which
provides for war reparations and reflects custom, concerns inter-State
responsibility alone.1 8  Indeed, only inter-State claims can address the
magnitude of war-claims. 19 Although Greek and Italian Courts have
allowed reparation claims by individuals, the conferral of such a right on
individuals under customary international law requires consistent practice
to that effect. 20  Accordingly, the Van Bouven/Bassiouni Principles,
providing for individuals' right to claim reparation before national courts,
stipulate that these guidelines are lexferenda.121
114. Malhous v. Czech Republic, App.No.33071/96; Pauwelyn, The Concept of 'Continuing
Violation' of an International Obligation, 66 BY1L 415, 423(1995).
115. U.N.Doc.A/56/10, 60.
116. Tomuschat, Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 TUL. J.INT'L
&COMP.L. 157, 173(2002).
117. Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 ["Princz"]; Bong, Compensation for Victims of Wartime
Atrocities, 3(1) J.INT'L CRIM. JUST. 187, 188(2005).
118. Zwanenburg, Van Bouven/Bassiouni Principles, 24 NETh.Q.HuM.RTS. 641, 658(2006).
119. Gattini, The Dispute on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Before the ICJ, 24(1) LJ1L
173, 193(2011) ["Gattini"].
120. Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774 (Judge Bork Conc.Op.).
121. U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2003/63, 8.
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b. States can waive claims on behalf of individuals.
Post World War peace treaties unequivocally suggest that States'
authority to waive the claims of individuals is "universally accepted."
122
Further, practice of states, entitled to claim reparations, has expressly
affirmed the lawful exercise of sovereign authority to waive claims,
including claims forjus cogens violations.123 Indeed, such waiver clauses
are valid as they do not directly conflict with jus cogens norms. 124 Further,
the lack of alternate remedy does not restrict such authority of States1
5
where the legitimate aim of establishing peaceful relations and quelling
further injury is proportionate to the waiver. 126 Since the Mai-Tocao War
had resulted in loss of life and property and had reached a stalemate, the
waiver of claims by both States to achieve such legitimate aim is justified.
Although China criticized the Japanese Court decision dismissing
Chinese nationals' claims for war reparations, its reaction is inapposite as it
did not question the Court's ruling on the validity of the waiver clause.
127
Moreover, in response to the recent support of the US government for
individuals' claims against Germany, the Senate Judiciary Committee
clarified that the 1951 Peace Treaty barred the claims.
12
Thus, Aprophe submits that the unambiguous waiver of
individuals' claims under Article XV of the 1965 Treaty bars the
jurisdiction of Rantanian Court.
B. Rantania violated international law by denying sovereign immunity to
Aprophe
It is well settled that, subject to recognised exceptions, States enjoy
immunity from jurisdiction of foreign courts in consonance with sovereign
equality of States. Aprophe contends that the Rantanian courts' denial of
jurisdictional immunity violates international law as the 'tort exception' is
inapplicable in this case [a]. Further, the violation ofjus cogens norms
does not justify denial of immunity [b].
122. MCNAIR, LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 391,395 (1948); Draper, The Implementation and
Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Two Additional Protocols, 164 RDC 1,
43(1979).
123. Polish Institute for International Affairs, 172 German Affairs, in 9 Series of Documents
(1953); Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 AJIL
132, 141(2001); Nishimatsu Construction v. Song Jixiao, (Sup.Ct.Apr.27), 2007 ["Nishimatsu"l.
124. Fitzmaurice, Third Report, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.l, 44,45.
125. Taiheiyo v. The Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 4th 380, 395.
126. Prince v. Germany, App.No.42527/98, 56-59.
127. Asada & Ryan, Post-war Reparations between Japan and China and Individual Claims,
27 J.JAPAN.L. 257,282(2009).
128. Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 14 (2000).
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1. The tort exception is inapplicable as it does not include acts of armed
forces
The tort exception justifies denial of immunity from jurisdiction of
foreign courts to States for injury caused by its organs in the forum State.
However, Aprophe submits that the exception does not include within its
scope the activities of armed forces.
2 9
Since the conduct of armed forces, inextricably linked to states'
foreign and defence policy, 130 is regulated through inter-State agreements,
the 'tort exception' does not extend to such conduct.13 1  Indeed, the
exception concerns "accidents occurring routinely within the territory" of
the forum State. 32 Thus, the European Convention, 33 legislations of UK134
and Australia135 expressly exclude armed forces' conduct. Additionally,
even in the absence of an express exclusion, the UN Convention 136 and
States' declarations 13 endorse this interpretation. Further, the Italian
Military Court in Lozano observed that the exception does not include such
acts. 138 Although the Greek SC considered the conduct of armed forces
within the 'tort exception', the Greek Special Supreme Court rejected this
view.' 39 Thus, Aprophe submits that the tort exception is inapplicable in
this case.
2. Violation ofjus cogens norms does not justify denial of jurisdictional
immunity
The alleged violation of a peremptory norm does not "automatically"
deprive states of their sovereignty. 4  Hence, a State performing such a
violation cannot be considered to have impliedly waived its immunity.
Indeed, the 'waiver exception' to immunity is narrowly construed.'
4
'
Further, Aprophe submits that independent of the recognised exceptions to
129. McElhinney v. Ireland, App.No.31253/96, 38.
130. Lechouritou v. Dimosio, C-292/05 (ECJ), 37.
131. U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1988/Add.I, I 11.
132. Hall, UN Convention on State Immunity, 55(2) ICLQ 411,412 (2006).
133. Article 31, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON STATE IMMUNITY, ETS.NO.074 (1972).
134. § 16(2), UK State Immunity Act, 1978, 17 ILM 1123.
135. §6, Australia Foreign States Immunities Act, 1985, 17 ILM 1123.
136. U.N.Doc.AIC.6/59/SR.13, 36.
137. Declarations of Sweden and Norway to the UN Convention.
138. Lozano v. Italy, ILDC 1085 (IT2008), 7.
139. Germany v. Margellos, ILDC87(GR2002), 14.
140. Gattini, War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision, 3(1) J.INT'L CRIM. JUST.
224,236(2005).
141. Sampson v. Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 19.
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sovereign immunity, denial of immunity for jus cogens violations is not
justified.
a. International law does not recognise ajus cogens exception to sovereign
immunity
Aprophe contends that sovereign immunity does not conflict with jus
cogens norms. Since immunity is a limitation on the jurisdictional powers
of national courts, it does not purport to justify the State's conduct or
recognise its lawfulness. 42 Consequently, it can conflict with a peremptory
norm only if that norm also implies a duty to establish jurisdiction that is
peremptory in nature. 143  However, as the Court has clarified, States'
obligation to punish and prosecute various crimes is without prejudice to
the immunities under customary international law. 44  Accordingly,
subsequently the Court14 and also the ILC observed that jus cogens does
not provide "automatic access to justice irrespective of procedural
obstacles". 46  Therefore, international law does not justify denial of
immunity based on the hierarchical supremacy ofjus cogens norms.147
Indeed, state practice is insufficient to prove the existence of a jus
cogens exception to jurisdictional immunity of States. 148 The European
Convention, the UN Convention, national legislations, dealing with State
immunity do not recognise this exception. 149 Further, during the drafting of
the UN Convention, the exception was not considered to be lex lata.5°
Indeed, the absence of ajus cogens exception in the Convention is "wholly
inimical" to Rantania's case. 151
The decisions of international and national courts 152 also militate
against the existence of a jus cogens exception. The ECHR has found no
142. Yang, State Immunity in the European Court of Human Rights, 74(1) BYIL 333,
340(2003).
143. Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its
Implications for National and Customary Law, 15(1) EJIL 97, 107(2004).
144. Arrest Warrant, 2002 ICJ 3, 60.
145. Armed Activities, 64.
146. Report of the Study Group of the ILC, Fragmentation of International Law,
U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/L.682, 372.
147. Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 156 (2008).
148. THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF ThE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 216 (Tomuschat
ed.,2006) ["TOMUSCHAT"].
149. Gattini, 174.
150. U.N.Doc.A/C.6/54L.12, 7.
151. Jones v. Saudi Arabia, 2006 UK-L 26, 26 ["Jones"].
152. Nishimatsu; Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] OJ No.2800, 88,90; Jones, 27.
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firm basis for it in custom. 15 3  The ICTY's decision in Furundjiza154 is
inapposite as it did not address the issue of damages in the context of State
immunity.' 5
The apparently contrary practice of US and Italy is not sufficient to
establish the customary law nature of the jus cogens exception. The sui
generis 'anti-terrorism' exception added to the US FSIA denies immunity
only for certainjus cogens violations and only to specific states. 5 6 Indeed,
even after the amendment, following pre-amendment rulings, US courts
grant immunity forjus cogens violations not expressly stated therein. 57
Rantania may rely upon Italian practice, in particular Ferrini and
Milde,158 to support the existence of the exception. However, the Court in
Ferrini itself acknowledged the absence of "definite and explicit
international custom" to support such a conclusion. 159 Further, the Court in
Tissino held: "international practice, even after Ferrini, had invariably
reiterated as fundamental' the rule on jurisdictional immunity... even
when the defendant state was accused of an international crime".160
Significantly, the Italian government did not consider Ferrini and Milde in
consonance with international law. 16 1  Hence, Italian practice, which is
inconsistent, cannot unilaterally alter custom.
1 62
Thus, Aprophe submits that international law does not recognise ajus
cogens exception to jurisdictional immunity.
IV. APROPHE'S DESTRUCTION OF A BUILDING OF THE MAI-TOCAO TEMPLE
DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Aprophe submits that the destruction of a building of the Mai-Tocao
Temple does not violate the 1965 Treaty [A], the WHC [B], the ICESCR
[C] or customary international law [D].
153. AI-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App.No.35763/97, 63; Kalogeropoulou v. Greece,
App.No.50021/00, 9.
154. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 155.
155. Per Lord Hoffman, Jones, 54.
156. TOMUSCHAT, 216.
157. Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1282.
158. Criminal proceedings against Milde, ILDC 1224(IT2009), 6.
159. Ferrini v. Germany, ILDC19 (IT2004), 11 ["Ferrini"].
160. US v. Tissino, ILDC 1262 (IT2009), 20.
161. Jurisdictional Immunities, 2008 ICJ General List No. 143, Memorial of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 18.
162. Lauterpacht, Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of States, 28 BYIL 220, 248(195 1).
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A. Aprophe's act does not violate the 1965 Treaty.
Aprophe's act does not violate Article 1 of the Treaty [a]. In any case,
the non-performance exception precludes its wrongfulness [b].
1. Aprophe did not violate Article 1 of the Treaty
Article 1, which ceases hostilities between the States, marks the
termination of armed conflict. 163 Therefore, a violation of this obligation
requires "unleashing a new war"'64 i.e. hostile acts directed against an
adversary causing harm to its military operations. 165  Since Aprophe's
destruction in its own territory would not constitute an act against
Rantania,166 it does not violate Article 1.
2. In any event, the non-performance exception precludes the act's
wrongfulness.
According to the non-performance exception, a general principle of
law, an injured State can withhold the execution of reciprocal obligations
under a treaty. 67  Although the VCLT and the ASR do not expressly
provide for this exception, it is a principle of treaty interpretation. 68 It is
implied through reciprocity that is inherent in certain treaty obligations such
as cease-fire agreements. 169 Since Rantania's attacks prevented 70 Aprophe
from performing its obligations under the Treaty, the non-performance
exception precludes the wrongfulness of the act.
B. Aprophe's destruction of a building of the Temple did not violate the
WHC.
Aprophe contends that Rantania lacks standing to invoke the WHC [a].
In any case, the WHC is inapplicable during armed conflict [b].
163. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 62 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2008).
164. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 46 (2005).
165. MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (2009) ["MELZER"].
166. SANDOZ ET AL, ICRC COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 1890(1987)
["SANDOZ"].
167. Diversion of Water from the Meuse, 1937 PCU., SeriesA/BNo.70 (Judge Anzilotti
Diss.Op.), 50; KJ0ckner v. Cameroon, 114 ILR 211(1989).
168. Crawford, Exception of Non-performance, 21 AUST. YBIL 55, 59(2000).
169. Report of the Secretary-General to the SC on the Palestine Question, U.N.Doc.S/3596, 7.
170. Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Consideredfrom the Standpoint
of the Rule of Law, 92 RDC 1, 119 (1957).
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1. Rantania lacks standing to invoke the WHC.
The preservation of World Heritage Sites within a State's territory is
the prerogative of the State. 171  Therefore, outside agencies can interfere
only with the State's consent. 72 Further, Chapter II accords primacy to
State sovereignty over cultural heritage. 7 3  This respect for state
sovereignty indicates that the WHC does not intend to create erga omnes
obligations.1
74
Moreover, 'collective interest' is a prerequisite to proving erga omnes
obligations. 75  The phrase 'outstanding universal value' only suggests
collective assistance,176 as indicated by the Preamble. 177 Additionally, the
substantive obligations do not prescribe the collective aspect.17 8  In any
event, the collective interest in protection of property is recognised only in
the diplomatic sense.' 79 In any case, erga omnes obligations do not confer
standing before the Court.
80
2. In any event, Aprophe's act does not violate the WHC.
a. The WHC is inapplicable during armed conflict.
The Preamble to the WHC suggest that it applies only in peace time as
its purpose was to secure the peace time protection of cultural heritage and
prevent it from "social and economic threats".'18  Indeed, the travaux
expressly rejects the applicability of Article 6(3) during armed conflict, as it
was decided that Hague Convention "should continue to govern States'
obligations in these circumstances. 82  The Director of UNESCO's
Cultural Heritage Division categorically endorsed this view.' 83 Further, the
171. Meyer, Travaux Preparatoires for the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 2 EARTH
LAW JOURNAL 45, 61(1976).
172. World Heritage Committee Report of the 18th Session, U.N.Doc.WHC-94/CONF.003/I 6,
14 IX.6.
173. Simmonds, UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 2 ART ANTIQUITY AND LAW 251, 270
(1997) ["Simmonds"].
174. Per Brennan J., Commonwealth of Australia v. State of Tasmania, [19831 HCA 21, 529.
175. Congo (Judge Simma, Sep.Op.), 35.
176. THE 1972 WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION 136 (Francioni ed., 2008) ["Francioni"].
177. 7th Preamble, CONVENTION CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF THE WORLD CULTURAL
AND NATURAL HERITAGE, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (1972) ["WHC"].
178. Francioni, 134.
179. Francioni, 134.
180. Barcelona Traction,1970 ICJ 3, 91; Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 226 (Judge Castro, Diss.
Op.), 387.
181. 1st Preamble, WHC; FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL HERITAGE 226-227 (2010).
182. Simmonds, 275.
183. U.N.Doc.WHC-2001/CONF.205/10 1.9.
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2003 Declaration reinforces the distinct applicability of the WHC in peace
time and the Hague Convention in armed conflict.184 Admittedly, ICTY
suggested that the protections of a World Heritage Site remain applicable in
armed conflict. 185 However, it relied on the List merely to determine the
'outstanding value' of the cultural property within the scope of Article 3(d)
of its statute.
186
In any event, the TIL governing protection of cultural property being
lex specialis187 excludes the applicability of WHC in armed conflict.188 The
Court's ruling in Nuclear Weapons that applied environmental treaties only
to determine breaches of IHL endorses this view.'
89
C. Aprophe 's act does not violate the ICESCR.
Aprophe contends that non-exhaustion of local remedies by Rantania
precludes its claim of diplomatic protection [a]. Alternatively, Aprophe's
act does not violate the ICESCR as the Convention does not apply either
during armed conflict [b] or extra-territorially [c]. Alternatively, the acts do
not violate Article 15(1)(a) [d].
1. Non-exhaustion of local remedies precludes Rantania's claim of
diplomatic protection.
Exhaustion of local remedies, as an essential requirement of
diplomatic protection, is a well-established rule of customary international
law. 190 Indeed, the optional protocol to the ICESCR also mandates this
requirement.19' Contrary to the Court's prior jurisprudence, the ILC
expressly requires States to exhaust local remedies even while seeking
declaratory reliefs192 to ensure that States "do not circumvent the ... rule"
by seeking reliefs in multiple proceedings. 193  Since Rantania has not
exhausted local remedies, its claim is inadmissible.
184. Articles IV, V, 2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of
Cultural Heritage, 32C/Res.38 (2004-2005).
185. Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-T, 279.
186. Vrdoljak, Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage and International Law,
MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 377, 388(2007).
187. O'KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 312(2006)
["O'KEEFE"].
188. Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L
L. 27, 32 (2005).
189. Nuclear Weapons, 28-3 1.
190. Diallo, 2007 ICJ General List 103, 43.
191. Article 10.1(c), ICESCR Optional Protocol, U.N.Doc.A/RES/63/117.
192. Article 14(3), ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, U.N.Doc.A/61/10.
193. Ar6chaga, 293.
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2. In any event, the ICESCR is inapplicable during armed conflict.
Rantania submits that in an armed conflict, IHL as lex specialis
194
prevails over general human rights norms. Hence, an act in compliance
with IHL would never violate HR standards. 195 Particularly, the ICESCR
contemplates progressive realization of rights, 196 through legislations,
which presumes the existence of peace. State Parties have opposed the
CESCR's deduction of non-derogable obligations under the ICESCR.' 97
Hence, the ICESCR is inapplicable during armed conflict.
3. In any event, the ICESCR does not apply extra-territorially.
The Court held that the obligations under the ICESCR are "essentially
territorial."'98 Further, States'99 have opposed CESCR's observations to
the contrary that the rights have extraterritorial application. In any event,
extra-territorial operation of human rights obligations arises only in
exceptional situations, for instance, where the state exercises territorial
control outside its borders.200 Hence, Aprophe has no obligations towards
Rantanian nationals.
4. In any event, the destruction does not violate Art. 15(1)(a).
In the event of an armed conflict, IHL, as lex specialis, determines the
scope of the HR obligation, the lex generalis.2 °1 Since IHL allows for
destruction of cultural property in cases of 'imperative military necessity',
the destruction is justified.2 °2
D. Aprophe's destruction of the building does not violate customary
international law.
Aprophe submits that Rantania cannot invoke custom as the obligation
to respect cultural property is not erga omnes [a]. In any case, such an
obligation does not confer standing. Alternatively, the destruction of the
Temple in this case is justified under the exception of military necessity [b].
194. Nuclear Weapons, 25.
195. Regina v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2005] EXHC 1809, 128-140.
196. Article 2(I), INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
197. Dennis & Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 98 AJIL 462,
495 (2004).
198. Wall, 2004 ICJ 36, 112.
199. U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2004/SR.5 1, 84; U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2005/52, 76.
200. Cyprus v. Turkey, App.No.25781/94, 76-81.
201. Nuclear Weapons, 25.
202. §IV(D), Memorial.
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1. The obligation to protect cultural property is not erga omnes in nature
International instruments governing cultural property do not contain
provisions suggesting the existence of an erga omnes obligation.2 °3
Although States unanimously condemned the destruction of the Bamiyan
Buddhas, only Ukraine classified it as a violation of international law.2°4
Indeed, the condemnation by States was diplomatic and not legal. 20 5 This
indicates the absence of opinio juris required for the formation of an erga
omnes obligation.
2. Alternatively, the military necessity exception justifies Aprophe's acts
While prohibiting destruction of cultural property, customary IHL
recognises the military necessity exception.20 6 Aprophe submits that the
destruction of the building does not violate IHL as: the military necessity
exception permits destruction of cultural property even when it is not used
for military purposes and is located within Aprophe's territory [i]; and the
present case satisfies the requirements of military necessity [ii].
a. The military necessity exception permits destruction of cultural property
not used for military purposes within the State's own territory.
Admittedly, custom recognizes the principle of distinction 20 7 and
cultural property may only be attacked if it qualifies as a military objective.
However, "[Diestructive acts undertaken by a belligerent in his own
territory would not comply with the definition of attack" under Art 49
of API208 Hence, Aprophe submits that its act constituted 'destruction'
and not an 'attack'. In fact, Netherland's military manual makes the same
distinction in the context of cultural property.20 9 Prior to the Second
Protocol, even UNESCO adopted the traditional interpretation of the
exception.210 Hence, although, Article 6(a) of the Second Protocol does not
expressly adopt this distinction, to the extent that it discards this distinction,
it departs from custom.
21
'
203. Brenner, Cultural Property Law, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 237,263 (2005-2006).
204. U.N.Doc.A/55/PV.94, 12.
205. O'Keefe, World Cultural Heritage, 53(1) ICLQ 189, 207(2004).
206. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW I 127-129 (Henckaerts & Doswald-
Beck ed. 2005).
207. Nuclear Weapons, 78.
208. SANDOZ, 1890.
209. Netherlands, Military Manual (1993); Netherlands, Military Handbook 7-36 (1995).
210. Hladik, The 1954 Hague Convention and the Notion of Military Necessity, 835 INT'L REV.
OF RED CROSS (1999) ["Hladik"].
211. O'KEEFE,251.
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b. Aprophe's act was justified by 'imperative military necessity'.
States have adopted212 the IMT's definition of military necessity as
allowing a belligerent to "to apply any amount and kind offorce to compel
the complete submission of the enemy... ' '213 This exception requires the
existence of a military purpose; nexus of the measure with the purpose and;
proportionality.214  Additionally, the word 'imperative' requires an
advanced warning and that the alleged act is the only available method.
21 5
Here, General Andler issued a statement giving an ultimatum. Further, the
report of the independent agency clearly indicated that the military capacity
of Aprophe had been exhausted.
First, the measure must have a legitimate military purpose. 216 This
may even be purely defensive in nature.217 In fact, AP1 recognises
defending "national territory against invasion" as a legitimate military
objective. 218 Hence, Aprophe submits that the act, aimed at ceasing the air
strikes and preventing an invasion, had a military purpose.
Secondly, the measure must have a reasonable nexus with the military
purpose.219 Since the Temple represents the shared culture of Aprophe and
Rantania, any damage to the Temple was against Rantania's interests.
Notably, States have taken such considerations into account. 220 Although
attacks for psychological advantage alone may violate IHL,22' such
advantage may be relied on to achieve a military purpose.
Thirdly, military necessity requires that the harm resulting from the
222measure be proportionate to the military value of the purpose. The
drafting history of the Hague Convention suggests that destruction of
cultural property to save human lives satisfies this requirement.223 Further,
destruction of even essential civilian objects, in response to a threat of
invasion, is permitted under Article 54(5) of API. Thus, the destruction of
one of the smaller buildings, which was aborted as soon as the purpose was
212. MELZER, 283-286.
213. US v. Wilhelm List, et al. ("The Hostage Case") (1948), XI TWC 1253- 54.
214. Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AJIL 251,254 (1953).
215. Hladik.
216. The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (UK Ministry of Defence, 2004) 2.2.
217. Hardman v. US, 6 RIAA 25, 26(1913); SHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS H 1332 (1976).
218. Article 54(5), ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(1977).
219. Wall, 137.
220. Meyer, Tearing Down theFacade, 51 AIR FORCE L. REV. 143, 169-171(2001).
221. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 86 (2004).
222. Beit Sourik Village v. Israel, HCJ 2056/04.
223. REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE CONVENED BY UNESCO, 277 (1954).
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achieved, was proportionate and satisfied the requirements of the exception
of imperative military necessity.
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CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Republic of Aprophe respectfully requests the Court to adjudge
and declare that:
1. Since the Andler government is the rightful government the
Republic of Aprophe, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over all
claims in this case;
2. Rantania is responsible for the illegal use of force against
Aprophe in the context of Operation Uniting for Democracy;
3. Since the Rantanian courts' exercise of jurisdiction in Turbando,
et al., v. The Republic of Aprophe violated international law,
Rantania may not execute the judgment in that case; and
4. Aprophe's destruction of a building of the Mai-Tocao Temple did
not violate international law.
